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Abstract 
 
The paper estimates the impact on school attendance and child labor of conditional cash payments 
to poor families in Brazil. It describes Brazil's transfer programs and presents statistics on school 
attendance and child labor. In the second half of the 1990s, many municipalities had adopted the 
"Bolsa Escola" (a cash transfer conditional on school attendance) and/or the federal minimum 
income program (in place during 1999 and 2000 and replaced by the "Bolsa Escola Federal" in 
2001). Although conditional cash transfer programs in Brazil have been in place since 1996, 
studies on their ex-post impact are very few. Micro household level data from the 2000 Census 
allows the use of propensity score methods to estimate the impact of income transfers on child 
labor and school attendance. The paper finds that income transfer programs had no significant 
effect on child labor but a positive and significant impact on school attendance. These 
preliminary results suggest that these programs have not been effective in fighting child labor in 
Brazil. They increase the chance of a poor child going to school but do not reduce her labor 
activity perhaps because she prefers to combine school and labor, considering that the transfers 
are too small to provide an incentive to forgo the labor income. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Using the data from the Census 2000, this paper tests whether income transfers to poor 
families have increased school attendance and reduced child labor in Brazil. After this 
introduction, section 2 briefly reviews the literature on child labor and section 3 discusses 
the relationship between child labor and school attendance. Using data from surveys 
(Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicílio (PNAD) of the Instituto Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatística (IBGE)), section 4 reviews the decline of child labor and the 
increase in school attendance in Brazil between 1992 and 2001. Section 4 also discusses 
the household characteristics that influence these two behavior outcomes. Section 5 
examines the income transfer programs in Brazil, such as the Program for Eradication of 
Child Labor (PETI), the municipal Bolsa-Escola programs starting in 1996, the Minimum 
Income Program (Programa de Garantia de Renda Mínima) of the Ministry of Education 
in 1999-2000, and the Bolsa-Escola Federal since 2001. Section 6 describes the Census 
data on school attendance and child labor in 2000 and section 7 uses the census data to 
test whether the income transfer programs in 2000 affected child labor and school 
attendance. Section 8 summarizes the main conclusions. 
 The 1973 convention of the International Labor Office (ILO convention 138) 
specifies fifteen as the age above which, in normal circumstances, a person may 
participate in economic activity and defines a child as a laborer if the child is 
economically active or gainfully employed. Basu (1999), cobbling information from 
various sources, reports that in 1990 there were nearly 79 million children economically 
active. ILO (1996) estimates that in 1995 there were 120 million children engaged in full-
time work. Most of them were in Asia. Evidence in 2000 suggests that the absolute 
number of children economically active in the world has been declining. There were 
approximately 1.5 million children working in Brazil in 2000 (Census, 2000). 
 Child labor has a tendency to decline with economic prosperity, the availability of 
schools and small incentives, such as providing children with a meal in school or giving 
parents a subsidy for sending their children to school. The declining trend in child labor is 
very clear in Brazil. But the relative importance of different factors that contributed to 
this declining trend is not yet well established. 
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 Fernandes and Souza (2003) report that between 1992 and 2001, the share of boys 
and girls between 10 and 17 years of age in the labor force in Brazil declined by 30 
percent. In 1992, 36 percent of boys (and 19 percent of girls) between 10 and 17 were in 
the labor force. In 2001, these ratios had fallen to 24 percent (and 12 percent). According 
to the 2000 census, 11 percent of boys and 5.4 percent of girls between 10 and 15 years 
old were in the labor market. 
 Not all types of labor are harmful to children. If associated with a nurturing 
working environment in the home, it can provide training and discipline for the labor 
market in adulthood. Nevertheless, the type of labor in which children are involved can 
impose substantial harm to their physical and mental health. In Brazil, long knives and 
machetes used for cutting, piling, and hauling the crops cause injuries among children 
working on sisal (jute) or sugarcane plantations. The heavy manual labor of agricultural 
activities places physical and emotional strain on the child workers. In urban areas 
children may be engaged in street vending, garbage collection, and illegal occupations 
such as selling drugs or prostitution. 
  Child labor also has an adverse impact on education and future earnings, as 
discussed in section 3. Governments and NGOs have tried a variety of laws and 
interventions to reduce child labor. Some countries have enacted laws prohibiting firms 
in their country from employing children under the age of fifteen. Organizations such as 
ILO, the WTO, and UNICEF have established conventions and encouraged nations to 
ratify them. The most powerful and controversial supranational institution to curb child 
labor is the imposition of international labor standards but the world has been slow to 
adopt them. Some countries have considered legislation and actions to curb child labor in 
developing countries. For instance, the Child Labor Deterrence Act debated in the US 
congress seeks to disallow the import of goods that produced with the help of child labor. 
Protectionist forces that represent narrow interests can misuse these interventions. 
Moreover, a ban, which is based on the working conditions and the imposition of 
minimal labor standards as a prerequisite for trade, results in the maintenance of 
standards only in the export sector. 
 Beyond home legislation, the major instrument for eradicating child labor is 
compulsory education. Policy makers and multilateral institutions are praising the 
achievements of programs of conditional income transfers in reducing child labor and 
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increasing the access of children to education. These programs deserve close scrutiny. 
The paper begins by examining the major insights of the literature on child labor in the 
next section.  
  
2. The literature 
 
There is a strong belief that poverty causes child labor. The World Bank and national 
governments have collected large data sets on household behavior during the 1990s. The 
data seems to confirm that the most important cause of child labor is parental poverty 
(Basu, 2003). Yet, Barros, and Velazco (1994) as well as Goldbaum, Garcia and Lucinda 
(2000), comparing data from numerous Latin American countries, found that poverty 
does not explain the share of working children in those countries. Such findings impose 
the need of considering other causes and triggering factors beyond poverty that play a 
role in determining child labor. 
The formal analysis of child labor is closely related to the modeling of household 
behavior. Becker (1964) pioneered the traditional model of the household as a unit. 
Subsequent work considered the household behavior as the outcome of internal bargains 
and power struggle (Bourguignon and Chiapori, 1994). Other models assume that a child 
has negligible bargaining power in the household and is an instrument for parents' 
maximization of effort. Gupta (1998) models the bargaining between the parent and the 
employer. 
Basu and Van (1998) argue that the early household models overlooked an 
important fact: a labor market, where children are potential workers, will be prone to 
having more than one equilibria. Basu (2003) explains why this insight is important: 
"Consider a poor country, where wages are very low and all children are for that 
very reason made to work. Now assume, for the sake of argument, that child labor is 
banned. The firms that are using child labor will be forced to seek adults to fill those 
gaps. Hence the wage rate of adult labor will rise. Now, it is entirely possible that, the 
wage were high to start with, then the parents would not have sent the children out to 
work anyway. Hence, even if the law is now revoked, wages will be high, children will 
not work and this will sustain the high wage. In other words, this economy had multiple 
equilibria and hence the law works simply as a mechanism for deflecting the economy 
 5
from the inferior equilibrium, where wages are low and children work, to the superior 
equilibrium, where wages are high and there is no child labor."  
But this may not always be the case. Of course, minimal restrictions, such as 
restrictions that prevent children from working in hazardous occupations, are worthwhile 
enforcing legally. But there is no unconditional answer to a total ban even if it were 
feasible and costless to implement because there are situations in sufficiently poor 
regions where a ban on child labor can cause children to starve or drive them to 
underground activities. If deemed desirable, a good way to implement a ban is to make 
schooling compulsory. Even when work is compatible with part time work, it prevents 
full time work and schooling is desirable in itself. 
Child labor is also part of the household's risk management strategy as shown by 
Mendelievich (1979), Cain and Mozumder (1980) and Grootaert and Kanbur (1995). The 
impact of job loss and other shocks on the households' income stream is more severe on 
poor households that have no savings and cannot borrow. Thus, both low income and the 
constraints imposed by the limited asset base of poor households explain child labor 
supply.  
Evidence on the relationship between child labor and the availability of credit 
suggests that extending access to borrowing may be an effective way of reducing child 
labor in poor countries (Dehejia and Gatti, 2002). 
World Bank (2001) reports that in Brazil a child whose father experiences a shock 
and is in the lowest income quintile has an approximately 42 percent greater probability 
of dropping out of school than a child in the same quintile whose father does not 
experience a shock.  Children in the second and third income quintiles whose parents 
experience an income loss have about a 30 percent greater probability of dropping out of 
school than those whose parents do not experience an idiosyncratic shock to their income.  
Grade repetition increases by about 23 percent for children in the lowest income quintile 
when their parents experience an income shock. This evidence supports the argument that 
credit-constrained households will cope with crises by changing their children’s time 
allocation by substituting away from school toward work.    
Beyond the household's ability to cope with income fluctuations, other key factors 
that affect child labor supply include household size and composition, and the education 
and employment status of parents. Grootaert and Patrinos (1999) focus on the labor 
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supply decision by the household and report the findings of a comparative study in Côte 
d'Ivoire, Colombia, Bolivia, and the Philippines. The key findings are the following: in 
all four countries, the more educated the parents the less likely are their children to work; 
the older children are more likely to work than younger children and boys are more likely 
to work then girls; a family rural enterprise increases the probability that a child will 
work. The probability of child labor is always higher in rural then in urban areas and 
among the poor; children's wages constitute a substantial share of the family budget in 
the rural areas of the four countries studied. 
On the demand side, both the functioning of the labor market and the production 
technology influence the demand for child labor. Wages in the labor market determine 
the income to child and adult labor. Discrimination or segmentation in the labor market 
and the production technology determine the extent to which the labor of children and 
adults can substitute for one another. The stigma associated with having children at work 
influences both demand and supply of child labor and is negatively related to the amount 
of child labor that occurs in society. 
Suppose that intervention, such as monetary incentives to send children to school, 
can reduce child labor little by little. At some point, as we move to a zone where child 
labor is not anymore widespread and the stigma associated with sending one's children to 
work increases, child labor will tend to fall off rapidly. This hypothesis is consistent with 
the evidence in many countries of a rapid decline of child labor over a short period of 
time. 
Intergenerational child labor traps are also possible (Baland and Robinson, 2000). 
People who work as children grow up without enough human capital are thus poor as 
adults. Poverty compels them to send their children to work, trapping the family line in a 
perpetual child labor cycle. Emerson and Souza (2003) find that in Brazil parents who 
worked when they were children are more likely to have their own children in the labor 
force. They also find that parents who worked during childhood are more likely to send 
their children to work even if adult incomes were to be held constant. This evidence 
suggests that causation goes beyond economics and that parents, who work as children, 
are likely to have social norms that attach less value to children's schooling. 
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3. Child labor and school attendance 
 
The combination of high opportunity costs of school attendance and an education system 
with low quality will result in low valuation of the returns to child's education, low 
school attendance and high participation of children in the labor market. Child labor can 
harm the child's development if it affects the child's health or take away time the child 
could use to build its human capital. Children who work end up with lower salaries in 
adult life in comparison with similar individuals who went to school. 
Papers that investigate the relationship between education and child labor find 
that school and part time work are not mutually exclusive activities. In some cases, 
working makes it possible for children to go to school. A restricted amount of work and 
school can thus be complementary (Peter Jensen and Helena Nielsen, 1997, Grootaert, 
1998, Psacharopoulos, 1997, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos, 1997). Yet, compulsory 
education can play a role in limiting child labor and even where education is not 
compulsory, the availability of good schools can move children away from long hours of 
work (Addison and others, 1997). 
 World Bank (2001) shows evidence for Brazil that suggests that child labor tends 
to lead children to substitute away from both school and leisure. The majority of children 
who work in Brazil are also enrolled in school. But among those who are not working a 
higher share is enrolled in school than among children who are working. Thus, there 
appears to be some reduction in quantity of schooling in the presence of child work. 
Enrollment for nonworking children remains strictly above those of working children 
across all ages and the difference increases across increasing age cohorts. 
 Working children in Brazil typically enter school 4 months later than nonworking 
children (World Bank, 2001).  Those children who work lag behind in grade by 0.05 
years for every year they remain working. Child labor negative impact on educational 
achievement is larger in rural areas when compared to children in urban areas. The 
correlation between early work and school attainment at the local level is negative, as 
expected.  The highest incidence of child labor can be found in the regions with the worst 
schooling indicators. In many states, however, the association between child labor and 
schooling indicators is not statistically different from zero, which confirms that factors 
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other than early entry into the labor force influence school retention and learning 
outcomes.  
 Ilahi and Sedlacek (2000) analyze the lifetime earnings implications of child 
labor, using a unique dataset on adult earnings in Brazil.  In their survey, respondents 
were asked retrospectively if they worked when they were children.  By treating child 
labor symmetrically with child schooling in regressions explaining adult wages, they 
were able to isolate the long-term impact of child labor on human capital accumulation. 
Early entry into the workforce reduces lifetime earnings by 13 to 17 percent.  It raises the 
probability of being poor later in life (that is, falling into the bottom 40 percent of the 
income distribution) by 7 to 8 percent.  Both direct effects (independent of the effect on 
education) and indirect effects (through the effects on education) are statistically 
significant.  The direct effect of child labor is about 3 percent for adult wages and 4 to 5 
percent for poverty.  The indirect effects through education are also quite large in 
magnitude—11 to 14 percent for wages and about 3 percent for poverty. 
Grootaert and Kanbur (1995) argue that social returns to education may exceed 
private returns. Thus government intervention to direct children away from the labor 
force and to the classroom may be desirable. The ideal policy according to Grootaert and 
Kanbur is to bolster the returns to education. Government can also intervene by providing 
more and better schools and by giving school meals to children or cash incentives to poor 
parents who send their children to school. 
Changes in institutions, increased number of schools in the rural areas, and the 
introduction of social programs  such as income transfer to poor families with the 
condition that children should attend school  can also explain changes in children's 
participation in the labor market and school attendance. Bourguigon, Ferreira and Leite 
(2003) observe that a growing number of developing countries are adopting cash transfers 
targeted to poor people, but conditional on some behavior on their part, such as school 
attendance. The paper puts forward a method (based on estimated models of household 
behavior) to simulate the effects of alternative program designs on behavior and welfare. 
It applies the method to Brazil's recently introduced Federal Bolsa Escola Program. The 
conditionality in the program has a strong effect on school attendance. The effect on 
current poverty and child labor is muted in the simulations of the paper. Evidence in 
section 7 is consistent with this result. 
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The next section discusses the association between increases in school attendance 
and reduction in child labor between 1992 and 2001 and the economic and demographic 
characteristics of children and their families. 
 
4. Changes in child labor and school attendance in Brazil from 1992 to 2001 
 
As observed in section 2, poverty is an important factor behind child labor. Poverty is 
associated with the characteristics of the household: parents' education, region, size of the 
household, and the age of the children. Changes in the distribution of these characteristics 
can be associated with changes in children's participation in the labor market and school 
attendance. This section summarizes main findings in Fernandes and Souza (2002). The 
analysis uses the data from the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicílio (PNAD) 
of the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). The sample consists of 
children between 10 and 17 years: 28,017 girls and 29, 804 boys in 1992 and 29,804 girls 
and 30,350 boys in 2002.  
 Beginning in early 1990s, child labor in Brazil declined and school attendance 
increased. Boys at work were 36.3 percent in 1992 and 23.5 percent in 2001. Girls at 
work were 18.5 percent in 1992 and 12.5 percent in 2001. The percentage of boys going 
to school increased from 76.1 percent in 1992 to 90.6 percent in 2001. The percentage of 
girls going to school increased from 79.8 percent in 1992 to 90.5 percent in 2001 (table 
1).   
The decomposition method shows that the decline in child labor and the increase 
in school attendance observed in the period are mostly due to changes inside each group 
under analysis. The most pronounced changes between 1992 and 2001 occurred among 
children between 14 and 17 years in contrast to children between 10 and 13 years. It also 
occurred among children living in households where the head of the household had less 
than three years of schooling. This result suggests that changes occurred among the 
poorest families. 
Table 2 shows that the reduction in the probability of child labor does not depend 
on the gender of the head of the household or on the size of the family. The reduction of 
this probability is clearly bigger for children 14 to 17 years old than for children 10 to 13 
and in households where the head of the household has less than 3 years of education. It 
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is also bigger in the rural than in the urban area. But, as the children population is bigger 
in the urban area, the contribution of the decline in child labor in the urban are to the total 
decline in child labor is bigger than the contribution of the decline in child labor in the 
rural area. Results are the same for boys and girls. 
Table 3 shows that the increase in the probability of a child attending school also 
does not depend on the gender of the head of the household or on the size of the family. 
The change of this probability is clearly bigger for children 14 to 17 years old than for 
children 10 to 13 and in households where the head of the household has less than 3 years 
of education. It is also bigger in the rural than in the urban area. But, as the children 
population is bigger in the urban area, the contribution of the increase in school 
attendance in the urban are to the total increase in school attendance is bigger than the 
contribution of the increase in school attendance in rural areas. Results are the same for 
boys and girls. 
Results in tables 2 and 3 suggest that the decline in child labor could be closely 
associated with the increase in school attendance. Section 7 will test the impact of cash 
transfer programs on both child labor and school attendance. 
 
5. Income transfers programs in Brazil: 
PETI, Bolsa-Escola, Renda Mínima and Bolsa-Escola Federal 
   
This section reviews a group of programs of income transfer to poor families on the 
condition that children should attend school, beginning with the program for the Child 
Labor Eradication Program (PETI). 
World Bank (2001) offers a positive evaluation of PETI. The objective of the 
program was to eradicate the worse forms of child labor by providing cash grants to 
families with children of school-going age (7 to 14) and by requiring that children attend 
school both 80 percent of the required number of hours at school and the jornada 
ampliada (a program of after-school activities). In 1996, the federal government 
implemented a pilot program in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, an area of high 
incidence of children working in the production of charcoal. In January 1997, the 
program was introduced in the state of Pernambuco (which has high numbers of children 
working in the cultivation of sugarcane) and in July 1997, in the sisal region of the state 
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of Bahia. By 1999 the program had managed to reach 166 municipalities in eight states 
and provided assistance to more than 131,000 working children (almost 10percent of 
working children in Brazil).  
Pianto and Soares (2003) use the PNAD survey and find that PETI reduced child 
labor and increased schooling between 1997 and 1999. They use two different 
methodologies: they measure the change from a baseline level in municipalities where 
PETI was introduced and they also match municipalities to form a comparison group. 
They find that the child labor impact of PETI is robust to the difference in difference 
analysis.  
 World Bank (2001) observes that many challenges besiege the expansion of PETI 
to urban areas. Child labor is more difficult to target in urban areas because occupations 
are much more heterogeneous than those in rural areas. Many of the forms of child labor 
take place in the streets and data for children vending items, collecting trash, selling 
drugs, and engaging in prostitution are difficult to obtain. Strategies to involve families in 
the program would be more difficult because of the potential weak link between children 
working on urban areas and their families. Exposure to drugs and violence may require 
additional methodologies and support, such as counseling and rehabilitation. 
 The Bolsa Escola programs are poverty-targeted social assistance programs 
similar to PETI as they give cash grants to poor families with school-age children (7-to-
14-year-old children). The differences between the two programs are that PETI was 
initially introduced in rural areas and Bolsa Escola is initially located in metropolitan 
areas. PETI targets the worst forms of child labor while the Federal Bolsa Escola, 
initiated in 2001, selects families based on an income-means test and/or a scoring system. 
 Bolsa Escola programs have ambitious objectives. They aim at increasing 
educational attainment among today’s children and thus at reducing future poverty. By 
requiring children in beneficiary households to have minimum attendance in school, the 
programs implicitly aim at reducing child labor. By transferring income to poor families, 
they could also reduce current poverty.   
 In 2002, 5,545 municipalities (99.7 percent of all Brazilian municipalities) had 
joined the Bolsa Escola Federal. The program provided assistance to five million children 
according to the Ministry of Education (2002). Until October 2002, the program had 
spent R$ 1.3 billion from the R$ 2 billion in the budget for 2002. The Ministry of 
 12
Education (2002) calculated the operational cost of the program around 7 percent of 
distributed benefits. The program pays R$ 15.00 per child between 6 and 15 years old (up 
to R$ 45.00) to a family with an income per capita below R$ 90.00. The mother promises 
to keep all the children in school. 
 The idea of paying an income transfer to poor families that allow them to keep 
their children in school was born in the 1980s at the University of Brasília under the 
coordination of professor Cristovam Buarque and was implemented in 1995 by the 
government of the Distrito Federal. In 1996, the Bolsa-Escola received a UN prize and 
become a model for the rest of the country. Despite all the enthusiasm in Brazil and 
abroad surrounding the program, our knowledge about its costs and benefits are still 
imperfect.  
Yet the appeal of minimum income programs continues to grow in recent years 
prompted by preliminary evidence that these programs can have positive repercussions 
by reducing poverty in the short term and by upgrading education among social groups 
excluded from the social protection system. Programs in place include in Mexico: 
Oportunidades/Progresa; in Brazil: Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentação and Programa de 
Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil (PETI); in Colombia: Familias en Acción; in Honduras:  
Programa de Asignación Familiar (PRAF); in Jamaica: Program of Advancement through 
Health and Education (PATH), in Nicaragua: Red de Protección Social (RPS) and in 
Bangladesh: Food for Education. Soufias and Parker (2001) and Buddelmeyer and 
Skoufias (2003) provide evidence that in Mexico PROGRESA had a positive effect the 
school attendance of both boys and girls in primary and secondary school and a small but 
negative impact on children’s labor market participation (especially boys). Since the fall 
in the incidence of work is smaller than the increase in schooling, the adjustment seems 
to be coming mostly through leisure time, as well as through domestic work primarily in 
the case of girls. 
The endorsement of the Bolsa Escola program in Brazil by the World Bank is 
based on a case study: the case of Brasília, Distrito Federal (DF). See World Bank 
(2002). The endorsement of the International Labor Office (ILO) is based in the case 
study of Recife. See Levinas and others (2001). 
 In 1999, many states and municipalities had replicated the Bolsa-Escola Program. 
World Bank (2002) refers to 60 programs. Levinas and others (2001) refer to more than 
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100 programs. But both documents reproduced the only systematic counting of the 
programs done at the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada. (Levinas and Bittar, 
1999). According to this document, in 1998, the program existed in three states (Amapá, 
Goiás, and Tocantins), in 45 municipalities in São Paulo, and in other nine municipalities 
in different states. Adding the programs of four other states (Alagoas, Minas Gerais, 
Mato Grosso do Sul, and Acre) that were not in Levianas and Bittar's list, we obtain 61 
programs at the beginning of 1999. Other 17 non-governmental programs, called Bolsa 
Escola Cidadã, also exist and are run by the NGO Missão Criança. 
 Detailed analysis of the Bolsa Escola before 1999, always cover the same 
programs: Brasília DF, Campinas and Recife. Brasilia DF between 1995 and 1998 is the 
most successful case. At the end of Cristovam Buarque's administration, the program 
covered 80 percent of the families with an income per capita below half the minimum 
wage and residing in Brasília, DF, for more than five years. The program increased 
school attendance and reduced child labor using less than one percent of Brasília's 
budget. Part of the success derives form the relative affluence of Brasília in relation to 
other municipalities. While the Distrito Federal would need one percent of its budget to 
benefit all children between 7 and 14 years old belonging to families with an income 
below half the minimum wage, Salvador (Bahia) would need 20 percent of its own 
budget to obtain the same result (World Bank, 2002). 
  At the end of the 1990s, Recife's program covered just two percent of the poor 
families and around 20 percent of the families with the characteristics requested by the 
program, including time of residence. (Levinas and others, 2001). The program did not 
have an impact on reducing child labor. The children who benefited from the program 
had a worse score on a performance test than the children who did not receive the benefit 
but had the same characteristics of the group benefiting from the program. 
 Levinas and others (2001) asserts that the vast majority of municipal programs in 
1998-99 served a very small fraction of the poor population and that many municipalities 
substituted food or cooking gas for cash payments. The programs did not aim at 
guaranteeing that a child would finish primary education. On the contrary, in some 
municipalities there was a turn over of beneficiaries with a family, which was benefited 
in one year, being forced to leave the program the following year to open space for 
another family. 
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 Just before the 1998 elections, the Ministry of Education launched the Minimum 
Income Program (Programa de Garantia de Renda Mínima) for municipalities with an 
income per capita and tax revenues below the average of its respective state. The program 
objective was to benefit children between 7 and 14 years old attending school. In 
December 1999, the Ministry of Education informed that the program benefited 504,000 
families (and around one million children) in one fifth of all Brazilian municipalities, 
with differentiated payments that averaged R$ 37.00 per family. 
 Until now, evaluation of the impact of the set of these programs on poverty, 
education and child labor do not exist. It is not know what happened to municipal 
programs after the introduction of the Minimum Income program and the government 
never made or published an analysis of this program. The program disappeared in 2001 
as the government substituted the Bolsa Escola Federal for it. The government is 
currently discussing the possibility of substituting all income transfer programs 
(including the "Fome Zero" created in 2003) with a single benefit program. The program 
would make use of cash payments and conditions such as school attendance or visits to 
local clinics. Camargo and Ferreira (2001) argue in favor of this reform. The major 
difficulty is to build a trustworthy catalogue of poor families entitled to benefits. The 
catalogue (inherited from the previous government) was done in a hurry by mayors 
themselves. As a consequence, the catalogue has many beneficiaries' addresses as the 
address of the prefecture itself. See Ferreira (2003). Before moving in the direction of a 
single conditional benefit, it is also important to know the impact of existing cash transfer 
programs. 
 
6. The Census Data and The evidence from the Census 
 
The Brazilian Census 2000 developed by the Brazilian Census Bureau IBGE is a 
household level sample that covers around 12 percent of the Brazilian population. 
Similarly to the Public Use Sample (PUMS) of the United States Census Bureau, the 
micro data sample from the Brazilian census is representative to the entire country at each 
municipality level and includes information on demographics and labor market variables. 
The advantages of the Census compared to other household surveys available in Brazil 
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are that it covers the entire country whereas the other surveys not, and, it has information 
on transfers from social programs that are not available in the others.   
In order to estimate the incidence of child labor and school attendance in Brazil and its 
regions, we selected a sample of all children aged ten to fifteen years old with valid 
information  on child labor and school attendance. The school attendance variable is 
obtained from the question “attend school or day care” and a child is considered working 
if he or she is regularly occupied in the labor market or in domestic activities linked to 
the market. We start from a ten-year-old child because available information on child 
labor starts at this age. The fifteen year old cut-off is justified by the fact the Brazilian 
labor law imposes sixteen years of age as the minimum age at which a person is allowed 
to participate legally in the labor market. The sample consists of 2,387,677 children and 
its basic statistics are presented in the Table A.1.a in the Appendix. 
In 2000, approximately 18 million children between 10 and 15 years old (8,689,984 girls 
and 9,086,986 boys) lived in Brazil (Census 2000, IBGE). Among these children, 8.32 
percent or close to 1.5 million children were in the labor force (table 4).  Among the 
working children in Brazil, 54 percent were in the urban area and 46 percent in the rural 
area. Although the share of working children in the rural area is higher than in the urban 
area, the absolute number of working children is higher in the urban area than in the rural 
area. Moreover, because the population differ much across states and the most populous 
states are not the poorest, there is an enormous difference among states with the highest 
absolute numbers of working children and the states with highest shares of working 
children. More than half of working children (51 percent of them) were in only six states: 
São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Bahia, Ceará, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraná. São Paulo and 
Minas Gerais have the highest number of working children (approximately 164 thousand 
and 157 thousand respectively). Amapá and Roraima have the lowest number of working 
children (above 2 thousand, each). The highest shares of working children are in Rodonia 
and Tocantis (14 percent and 13.6 percent respectively). The lowest shares are in Distrito 
Federal (2.2 percent) and Rio de Janeiro (3.4 percent). 
Ninety two percent of the girls between 10 and 15 years old and 84.2 percent of 
the boys just attended school. The proportion of children who both worked and went to 
school was much higher than the proportion of children who just worked. For the country 
as a whole, on average, 4.6 percent of girls and 9.1 percent of the boys attended school 
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and worked; 0.8 of the girls and 2 percent of the boys just worked. The remaining 4.4 
percent of the girls and 4.7 percent of the boys did not work and did not go to school 
(table 5). These aggregate numbers hide wide variations across urban and rural areas. For 
instance, while 23.6 percent of boys in Brazil's rural area worked, 6.2 percent of boys in 
the urban area worked. 
Because the population in rural areas is smaller than population in urban areas, the 
five states with the largest share of working children in the rural area are not the same as 
the five states with the largest share of working children in both urban and rural areas. 
Table 6 and 7 show the highest incidence of working children by region and gender. This 
incidence varies widely across rural and urban areas in the same region and among boys 
and girls. For instance, more than 30 percent of boys in the rural areas of Piauí, Paraíba, 
and Espírito Santo worked while less than 2 percent of girls worked in the urban areas of 
Distrito Federal and around 2 percent of girls worked in the urban areas of Rio de 
Janeiro. 
The proportion of children who do not study and do not work is also very high. 
Approximately 25 percent of boys in the Amazon and 17 percent of girls in Rondonia do 
not work and do not go to school. Not only poverty in these states but also the lack of 
schools or the exclusion of some groups must play a role here. 
 
 
 
7. Econometric Tests 
 
Of particular interest to this study, the Census 2000 gathers information on the 
values of transfer income received by the individual from official transfer programs such 
as minimum income, bolsa-escola, unemployment insurance, and handicapped aid. Our 
goal is to disentangle the value received from unemployment insurance and aid for 
handicapped from the value received from minimum income and bolsa escola and then 
test the impact of these two latter programs on the incidences of child labor and school 
attendance among participating children in Brazil. 
The ideal experiment would be to observe the same children in both states of the 
world. One where there is no income transfer and another where there is nothing different 
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but the income transfer. Comparisons between outcomes from each state would give us 
the impact of the income transfer on the outcomes of interest. However, this ideal world 
is not observed. For that matter, we have to rely on constructed counterfactuals to be able 
to say something about the income transfer impacts. Given our data limitations, we are 
only able to tell which families received income transfers and which not. Those children 
living in families that received income transfers are our treatment group. Our 
counterfactuals are those children in families that could have received the income 
transfers but did not. In order to construct this comparison group, we apply the propensity 
matching score method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The method balances the 
observed covariates between the treatment group and a comparison group. 
The next section describes the selection of four different samples. All four 
samples include a treatment group and a random sample from which a different 
comparison group will emerge. 
 
7.1. The Sample Selection 
 
Our first step is to construct the treatment and comparison groups we assign a 
child to the treatment group if she belongs to a family that receives cash transfers. A 
family is considered receiving cash transfers if the father or the mother has strictly 
positive values on the income transfer variable. Conversely, a family is considered not 
belonging to an official income transfer program if the father and the mother do not 
receive any official income transfer. 
In order to eliminate the effect of the handicapped aid transfer we dropped from 
all samples all children that live in families where there is at least one handicapped 
member. 
The treatment group in the main sample includes all children aged 10 to 15 years 
old, living in families where parents receive transfers from social programs. These 
families represent around 2 percent of all children aged 10 to 15 years old in the Brazilian 
Census 2000. The main sample adds to this treatment group a random sample of 25 
percent of all 10 to 15 years-old children from families in which parents do not receive 
public transfers. Table A.1.b in the appendix presents the basic statistics of this "all 
families sample" with 428,740 observations. 
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We also create other three alternative samples:  "only poor families sample",  "all 
families with employed parents" and "only poor families with employed parents."   
In the "only poor families sample" we select a sub-sample of all children living in 
poor families because the bolsa-escola and the minimum income programs are supposed 
to target poor families. A family is considered poor if the family per capita income is 
equal to or less than one hundred reals (R$ 100) at 2000 values. The family per capita 
income is defined by the sum of all income (minus the transfers described previously) 
divided by the number of members in the family. Pensioners, domestic servants, relatives 
of domestic servants, and people living in collective houses were not considered family 
members. One hundred reals represent roughly 55 percent of the monthly minimum wage 
prevailing in 2000. 
The census does not ask separately for information on unemployment insurance 
payments received. So we are not able to separate the income from unemployment 
insurance from the conditional transfers for the complete sample. As unemployment 
benefits to poor families also act as a partial safety net as they prevent the families that 
benefit from it from falling further into poverty in the event of an adverse shock  it is 
important to know the impact of these transfers on child labor and school attendance. 
Yet, we also want to know what is the impact of conditionality. Thus, we try to 
sweep out the unemployment insurance effect by constructing two dummy variables, one 
for each unemployed parent. The assumption is that the parent receiving unemployment 
insurance is unemployed. Because people working in the informal market could at the 
same time be receiving unemployment benefits and we want to ensure that the effect of 
unemployment insurance does not affect the impact of conditional cash transfers on 
schooling and child labor, we build two other samples. These two sub-samples exclude 
unemployed parents. The "all families with employed parents" sample and the "poor 
families with employed parents" are sub-samples of children living in families where 
both parents are not unemployed and thus cannot be collecting unemployment insurance. 
Thus, they can be employed or out of the labor force. 
The basic statistics of these other samples can be obtained from authors.  
 
7.2. The Empirical Strategy 
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We construct for each child a school attendance indicator variable and a child 
labor indicator variable. The school attendance variable is obtained from the question 
“attend school or day care” and a child is considered working if he or she is regularly 
occupied in the labor market or in domestic activities linked to the market. 
 Additionally, we construct children characteristic variables, such as gender, age 
and ethnicity, as well as variables for fathers´ characteristics, mothers´ characteristics, 
family composition and the municipalities´ characteristics (described below). For 
children without a father or a mother, we assign zero values for his or her absent parent 
characteristics. In order to control for possible bias due to these assignments, we add a 
father absent indicator variable and a mother absent indicator variable. 
Children living in families that received income transfers are our treatment group. 
Our counterfactuals are those children in families that could have received the income 
transfers but did not. We assign three observations from the comparison group to each 
observation of the treatment group. This assignment is based on the predicted propensity 
scores estimated by a logit model where the dependent variable is the indicator variable 
for a child belonging to a family that receives the income transfers and the control 
variables are a set of children characteristics, father characteristics, mother 
characteristics, municipality characteristics, political party of the mayor in 2000, and 
others. The children characteristics are age, gender, race, and rural indicator. The parent 
characteristics are years of schooling, age, race, unemployment dummy and income 
minus transfer. The family composition are the numbers of children aged 0 to 5, number 
of individuals aged 6 to 15, and number of individuals above 16. The Municipalities 
characteristics are the averages and standard deviations of schooling, age, and income 
minus transfer, and the proportion of people living in rural areas. Additional controls are 
absent parent dummies. Since until 2000 the majority of these transfer programs are 
decentralized at local government levels and the criteria to a municipality having a 
conditional cash transfer program are not completely clear and may depend on political 
factors, we added the political party dummies as additional controls on the propensity 
scores calculations. We use the nearest neighborhood criteria for this matching with 
replacement and kept the observations in the common support only.  
A caveat is important to mention here. The underlying assumptions are that the 
assignment of treatment is independent over families conditional on observable controls, 
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and the outcomes are independent of participation given the observable controls. On this 
point, see, for instance Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Ravallion (2001). 
Four matched samples are obtained. The first two columns of table A.2 in the 
appendix shows the logit coefficients for the "all children" sample matching and the last 
two columns of the same table shows the coefficients for the "all poor children" 
matching. Table A.5 shows the logit results for the "all children with employed parent" 
sample matching and the results for the "poor children with an employed parent" sample 
matching. We follow Dehejia and Wahba (1998) and after units are matched we estimate 
the impact of transfers. 
 
7.3. The Results 
 
Having done the matching as described in the previous section, we proceed to collect the 
basic statistics of the resulting four samples. Tables A.3, A.4, A.7, and A.8 in the 
Appendix show the basic statistics for selected variables. These tables show that (in the 
treatment group, depending on the sample considered) the average income transfer for a 
father is between R$ 60 to R$ 75 and it is between R$ 48 to R$ 57 for a mother.  
Table 8 shows the effects of transfers for the "all children" sample. The effects are 
calculated separately for boys and girls. While 95 percent of boys attend school in the 
treatment group, around 92 percent of them attend school in the control group. The 
average treatment effect is an increase of 3 percentage points in school attendance among 
boys and the effect is highly significant. Considering that in the comparison group there 
are only 8 percent of boys out of school, a 3-percentage points change is a big effect.  
 On the other hand, there is no discernible difference for child labor between the 
two groups.  
We also obtain the impact of transfers on four other categories: children attending 
school only, working only, working and attending school, and children that do not work 
in the labor market and do not attend school. Table 8 shows that there is a transfer impact 
on reducing only working child incidence, an increase on work and school incidence, and 
a decrease in the no work and no school incidence among boys. It seems that the cash 
transfer program increases the incidence of school attendance by driving to school 
children who previously only worked and children who previously did not work and did 
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not go to school. Note that the decrease in the incidence of only work children is partially 
compensated by the increase in the incidence of school and work children and that 
explain why there is no net impact on child labor. The results for girls are similar except 
that there is a small positive net impact on child labor, possibly due to the fact that the no 
school/no work girl starts to work and go to school at the same time. 
Tables 9, 10 and 11 show similar results for the other samples. In the sample for 
"only poor children", the coefficients measuring the impact of transfers on school 
attendance is bigger than in the "all children" sample. Results described above for the "all 
children" sample remain the same when we repeat the tests for samples with "children 
with employed parents", as shown in Tables 10 and 11.  
Finally, we can shed some light on the determinants of school attendance (and 
child labor) by estimating a logit model using the matched samples again. Tables 12 and 
13 show evidence that supports the hypothesis that transfers made to mothers are more 
efficient than transfers made to fathers. In the logit models, school attendance the 
coefficient of transfers made to mothers are much bigger than the coefficient of transfers 
made to fathers and their difference is statistically different from zero. Interestingly, there 
are no statistically difference between the coefficients of transfers to fathers and transfers 
to mothers regarding child labor outcome. These results are partially consistent with 
Emerson and Souza (2002) where they find evidences of differences in intra-household 
allocation between father and mother and child´s gender.  
 
8. Final Remarks 
 
This paper examined the impact of cash transfer programs, such as minimum 
income program and the bolsa escola, on child labor and school attendance among ten to 
fifteen year-old poor children in Brazil. It finds that these programs have a significant 
impact on increasing school attendance. The results are the same for boys and girls, and 
seem to be robust since they are similar for alternative samples of children in poor 
families and samples that include only children with employed parents. 
Our results suggest that these transfers change the child´s time allocation between 
school and work. The cash transfer programs reduce the incidences of only work child 
and no work/no school child and increases the incidences of only school child and school 
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and work child.   That is, some of those children that are not at school nor at work or 
working only start to go to school and to work concomitantly.  
 
The paper does not find an impact of conditional cash transfers on reduction of 
child labor as net effect. A possible explanation for this finding is that the cash transfers 
are too small to create the incentive for families to forgo the income from child labor. 
The average transfer in 2000 was well below half a minimum wage for a father receiving 
an income transfer (including unemployment benefits) and around one quarter of a 
minimum wage for a mother receiving an income transfer (including unemployment 
benefits). Even if such transfers were approximately what a child earns working, they 
would not be enough to convince both parents and children to give up combining work 
with school (the condition for receiving an extra income). This would be particularly true 
if the income the child derives from work represents a substantial contribution to family 
income. Kassouf (2001) observes that for 17 percent of rural households in Brazil, the 
contribution to family income from working children aged 5 to 14 years represents more 
than 40 percent of the family income. Cavalieri (2003) argues that child labor could be 
part of the reason why children in Brazil, chiefly in the Northeast, perform poorly in 
school. Even if a small cash transfer can send children to school, it does not guarantee 
that children will leave the labor force and study. Improving the schools themselves will 
probably have to part of the solution of the child labor problem. 
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Source: Fernandes and Souza, 2002. 
Table1: Child Labor and School Attendance 
Brazil, 1992 - 2001 
(Percent) 
  Girls (10 to 17 years)  Boys (10 to 17 years) 
 1992 2001 Difference 1992 2001 Difference 
Child Labor 0.185 0.125 -0.061 0.363 0.235 -0.128 
School Attendance 0.798 0.902 0.104  0.761 0.906 0.144 
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Source: Fernandes and Souza (2002) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Decomposition of Changes in Probabilities of Child Labor 
According to Characteristics of the Group 
Brazil, 1992-2001 
(Percent) 
 Girls  Boys 
Characteristics  Weight   Total  Weight   Total 
Schooling of Head of  
Household 
0 to 3 years  -0.075 0.471 -0.036  -0.135 0.494 -0.067  
4 to 7  -0.044 0.304 -0.013  -0.093 0.294 -0.027  
8 to 10 -0.021 0.089 -0.002  -0.068 0.085 -0.006  
11 or more 0.016 0.136 0.002 -0.049 -0.045 0.127 -0.006 -0.106 
Gender of Head of  
Household 
Male -0.046 0.815 -0.038  -0.105 0.823 -0.086  
Female -0.058 0.185 -0.011 -0.049 -0.109 0.177 -0.019 -0.106 
 
Child's Age         
10 to 13 years -0.031 0.529 -0.016  -0.076 0.531 -0.041  
14 to 17 years -0.068 0.471 -0.032 -0.049 -0.139 0.469 -0.065 -0.106 
 
Region         
Rural -0.071 0.206 -0.015  -0.124 0.219 -0.027  
Urban -0.043 0.794 -0.034  -0.101 0.781 -0.079 -0.106 
 
Household Size         
Up to 4 People -0.048 0.658 -0.032  -0.098 0.684 -0.067  
 More than 4 People -0.049 0.342 -0.017 -0.049 -0.122 0.316 -0.038 -0.106 
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Source: Fernandes and Souza (2002). 
Table 3: Decomposition of Changes in Probabilities of School Attendance 
According to Characteristics of the Group 
Brazil, 1992-2001 
(Percent) 
 Girls  Boys 
Characteristics  Weight   Total  Weight   Total 
Schooling of Head of  
Household 
0 to 3 years  0.146 0.471 0.069  0.196 0.494 0.097  
4 to 7  0.078 0.304 0.024  0.096 0.294 0.028  
8 to 10 0.044 0.089 0.004  0.049 0.085 0.004  
11 or more 0.041 0.136 0.006 0.102 0.043 0.127 0.005 0.135 
Gender of Head of  
Household 
Male 0.103 0.815 0.084  0.134 0.823 0.110  
Female 0.098 0.185 0.018 0.102 0.136 0.177 0.024 0.135 
 
Child's Age         
10 to 13 years 0.068 0.529 0.036  0.085 0.531 0.045  
14 to 17 years 0.141 0.471 0.066 0.102 0.191 0.469 0.090 0.135 
 
Region         
Rural 0.170 0.206 0.035  0.222 0.219 0.049  
Urban 0.085 0.794 0.067 0.102 0.110 0.781 0.086 0.135 
 
Household Size         
Up to 4 People 0.102 0.658 0.067  0.135 0.684 0.092  
 More than 4 People 0.103 0.342 0.035 0.102 0.133 0.316 0.042 0.135 
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Table 4: Child Labor Incidence, Brazil, 2000 
Percent and Absolute Numbers 
States ordered by the total number of working girls and boys (10 to 15) 
State Absolute number of 10 to 
15 years old working 
children  
(Thousands) 
Share of working children 
among children of the 
same age in the respective 
state (Percent) 
Brazil 1,479.362 8.32 
   
1.  São Paulo 163.844 4.6 
2.  Minas Gerais 156.610 8.4 
3.  Bahia 155.481 10.2 
4.  Ceará 96.931 11.0 
5.  Rio Grande do Sul 89.929 9.3 
6.  Paraná 89.866 9.2 
7.  Maranhão 84.527 11.7 
8.  Pernambuco 83.254 9.5 
9.  Pará 79.028 10.4 
10. Santa Catarina  60.215 10.8 
11. Goiás 45.189 8.9 
12. Paraíba 45.135 11.5 
13. Piauí 43.799 12.5 
14. Rio de Janeiro 42.494 3.4 
15. Alagoas 36.791 11.0 
16. Espírito Santo 35.142 10.7 
17. Amazonas 27.479 8.0 
18. Mato Grosso 27.010 9.6 
19. Rondônia 23.538 14.0 
20. Rio Grande do Norte 21.874 7.0 
21. Mato Grosso do Sul 19.321 8.7 
22. Tocantins 18.503 13.6 
23. Sergipe 17.353 8.4 
24. Acre 6.556 9.6 
25. Distrito Federal 4.325 2.2 
26. Amapá 2.758 4.7 
27. Roraima 2.410 6.1 
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Table 5 
Child Labor Incidence 
Boys and Girls, Urban and Rural Areas  
Brazil, 2000 
(Percent) 
 Girls (10 to 15 Years) Boys (10 to 15 Years) 
 Work (just 
work or work 
and go to 
school) 
Do Not Work 
and Do Not Go 
to School  
Work (just 
work or work 
and go to 
school)  
Do Not Work 
and Do Not Go 
to School  
Urban 4.1 3.3 6.2 4.0 
Rural 9.7 8.0 23.6 7.2 
Total 5.4 4.4 11.1 4.7 
 
Source: Census 2000, IBGE. 
 31
 
Table 6: 
Incidence of work among girls 10 to 15 years old 
Highest incidence in absolute numbers in urban or rural areas 
Urban area of Rural area of 
São Paulo 53,037 Bahia 27,100 
Minas Gerais 37,973 Rio Grande do Sul 18,626 
Bahia 21,074 Minas Gerais 15,828 
Paraná 17,702 Pernambuco 13,728 
Goiás 14,384 Maranhão 13,567 
    
Highest incidence as share of children of the same age (Percent) 
In the urban area of In the rural area of 
Tocantins 11.42 Rio Grande do Sul 19.65 
Goiás 6.73 Santa Catarina 18.42 
Mato Grosso 5.92 Espírito Santo 15.38 
Mato Grosso do Sul 5.43 Alagoas 13.29 
Minas Gerais 5.32 Rondonia 12.51 
 
Table 7: 
Incidence of work among boys 10 to 15 years old 
Highest incidence in absolute numbers in urban or rural areas 
Urban area of Rural area of 
São Paulo 88,795 Bahia 66,544 
Minas Gerais 61,225 Ceará 44,856 
Bahia 40,763 Maranhão 42,628 
Paraná 31,238 Minas Gerais 41,584 
Ceará 26,295 Pará 37,585 
    
Highest incidence as share of children of the same age (Percent) 
In the urban area In the rural area 
Tocantins 16.26 Espírito Santo 35.11 
Mato Grosso 11.36 Rondônia 33.79 
Rondônia 10.89 Rio Grande do Sul 31.81 
Goiás 10.69 Paraíba 31.40 
Maranhão 9.83 Piauí 31.24 
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Table 8: The Effects of Transfers - All Sample 
  Treatment  Comparison   Difference 
  Mean Std. Error  Mean Std. Error   Mean Std. Error 
 Boys 
School 0,949 0,002  0,918 0,001  0,031 0,002
Work 0,141 0,002  0,144 0,002  -0,004 0,003
Only School 0,827 0,003  0,801 0,002  0,026 0,003
Only Work 0,019 0,001  0,028 0,001  -0,009 0,001
School and Work 0,122 0,002  0,117 0,002  0,005 0,003
No School and No Work 0,032 0,001  0,055 0,001  -0,023 0,002
 Girls 
School 0,961 0,001  0,932 0,001  0,030 0,002
Work 0,074 0,002  0,069 0,001  0,004 0,002
Only School 0,895 0,002  0,875 0,002  0,020 0,003
Only Work 0,008 0,001  0,012 0,001  -0,005 0,001
School and Work 0,066 0,002  0,057 0,001  0,009 0,002
No School and No Work 0,031 0,001  0,056 0,001   -0,025 0,002
         
Table 9: The Effects of Transfers - Poor Children Sample 
  Treatment  Comparison   Difference 
  Mean Std. Error  Mean Std. Error   Mean Std. Error 
 Boys 
School 0,946 0,002  0,904 0,002  0,042 0,003
Work 0,144 0,003  0,152 0,002  -0,008 0,003
Only School 0,821 0,003  0,781 0,002  0,040 0,004
Only Work 0,019 0,001  0,029 0,001  -0,010 0,002
School and Work 0,125 0,003  0,123 0,002  0,002 0,003
No School and No Work 0,035 0,001  0,067 0,001  -0,032 0,002
 Girls 
School 0,958 0,002  0,921 0,002  0,038 0,003
Work 0,076 0,002  0,070 0,001  0,006 0,003
Only School 0,889 0,003  0,863 0,002  0,026 0,003
Only Work 0,007 0,001  0,013 0,001  -0,006 0,001
School and Work 0,069 0,002  0,057 0,001  0,012 0,002
No School and No Work 0,034 0,001  0,066 0,001   -0,032 0,002
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Table 10: The Effects of Transfers - All Sample 
Children with Employed Parents Only 
  Treatment  Comparison   Difference 
  Mean Std. Error  Mean Std. Error   Mean Std. Error 
 Boys 
School 0,946 0,002  0,912 0,002  0,034 0,003
Work 0,164 0,003  0,168 0,002  -0,004 0,004
Only School 0,803 0,003  0,777 0,002  0,027 0,004
Only Work 0,021 0,001  0,033 0,001  -0,012 0,002
School and Work 0,142 0,003  0,135 0,002  0,007 0,003
No School and No Work 0,033 0,001  0,055 0,001  -0,022 0,002
 Girls 
School 0,959 0,002  0,929 0,001  0,030 0,002
Work 0,085 0,002  0,076 0,001  0,009 0,003
Only School 0,883 0,003  0,867 0,002  0,016 0,003
Only Work 0,009 0,001  0,013 0,001  -0,004 0,001
School and Work 0,076 0,002  0,063 0,001  0,014 0,003
No School and No Work 0,032 0,001  0,057 0,001   -0,026 0,002
         
Table 11: The Effects of Transfers - Poor Children Sample 
Children with Employed Parents Only 
  Treatment  Comparison   Difference 
  Mean Std. Error  Mean Std. Error   Mean Std. Error 
 Boys 
School 0,942 0,002  0,897 0,002  0,045 0,003
Work 0,171 0,003  0,175 0,002  -0,004 0,004
Only School 0,793 0,004  0,755 0,003  0,038 0,005
Only Work 0,022 0,001  0,034 0,001  -0,012 0,002
School and Work 0,149 0,003  0,141 0,002  0,008 0,004
No School and No Work 0,036 0,002  0,069 0,002  -0,033 0,003
 Girls 
School 0,956 0,002  0,920 0,002  0,036 0,003
Work 0,090 0,003  0,078 0,002  0,011 0,003
Only School 0,875 0,003  0,855 0,002  0,020 0,004
Only Work 0,009 0,001  0,014 0,001  -0,005 0,001
School and Work 0,081 0,003  0,065 0,002  0,016 0,003
No School and No Work 0,035 0,002  0,067 0,002   -0,032 0,003
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Table 12 
 
Logit Model on School Attendance - All Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father 0,0018 0,0003  0,0015 0,0004
Transfers to Mother 0,0045 0,0005  0,0051 0,0006
Child's Characteristics      
Age -0,3861 0,0107  -0,3872 0,0120
Non-White Dummy -0,0541 0,0374  0,0793 0,0403
Father's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,0854 0,0088  0,0810 0,0098
Age -0,0109 0,0024  -0,0009 0,0028
Unemployed Dummy -0,1757 0,0600  0,0121 0,0695
Mother's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,1370 0,0079  0,1374 0,0089
Age -0,0029 0,0030  -0,0066 0,0033
Unemployed Dummy -0,1421 0,0584  -0,0105 0,0667
Family's Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0001 0,0002  0,0008 0,0003
Rural Dummy -0,2654 0,0420  -0,5530 0,0479
Metropolitan Area Dummy 0,1202 0,0724  0,0628 0,0752
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 -0,2202 0,0177  -0,2438 0,0198
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 -0,0568 0,0126  0,0021 0,0140
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0249 0,0142  -0,0371 0,0158
Municipality's Characteristics      
Schooling Average 0,3905 0,0721  0,0871 0,0796
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,0775 0,1091  0,1441 0,1217
Age Average -0,0955 0,0183  -0,0913 0,0204
Age Standard Deviation 0,2485 0,0320  0,2814 0,0362
Income Minus Transfers Mean -0,0020 0,0003  -0,0010 0,0004
Income Minus Transfers Standard 
Deviation 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,3793 0,1234  0,2463 0,1382
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,6597 0,1257  -0,1756 0,1437
Mother Absent Dummy -0,3932 0,1637  -0,7845 0,1808
Constant 4,6594 0,4084  3,8819 0,4633
Number of Observations 60.449     57.582   
Log-Likelihood -13.758,0630     11.398,1180   
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Table 13 
 
Logit Model on Child Labor - All Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father -0,0004 0,0002  0,0002 0,0003
Transfers to Mother -0,0001 0,0003  0,0006 0,0003
Child's Characteristics      
Age 0,4487 0,0082  0,4333 0,0112
Non-White Dummy -0,0223 0,0283  -0,0847 0,0372
Father's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0484 0,0061  -0,0556 0,0083
Age -0,0041 0,0020  -0,0016 0,0027
Unemployed Dummy -0,8278 0,0634  -0,4447 0,0771
Mother's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0383 0,0053  -0,0651 0,0073
Age 0,0089 0,0024  0,0040 0,0031
Unemployed Dummy -0,3662 0,0554  -0,3668 0,0714
Family's Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0005 0,0001  0,0005 0,0001
Rural Dummy 0,6715 0,0321  0,1548 0,0430
Metropolitan Area Dummy -0,5685 0,0662  -0,5522 0,0842
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 0,1032 0,0143  0,1280 0,0189
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 0,0685 0,0097  0,0734 0,0127
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0544 0,0117  -0,0249 0,0154
Municipality's Characteristics      
Schooling Average 0,0984 0,0492  0,3117 0,0665
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,5326 0,0798  -0,5891 0,1078
Age Average 0,0755 0,0093  0,0625 0,0131
Age Standard Deviation -0,0259 0,0105  -0,0424 0,0171
Income Minus Transfers Mean 0,0000 0,0003  -0,0004 0,0003
Income Minus Transfers Standard Deviation 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,5153 0,0931  1,2251 0,1262
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,3776 0,1022  -0,0245 0,1366
Mother Absent Dummy 0,3882 0,1387  -0,2767 0,2102
Constant -8,0730 0,2779  -8,4677 0,3873
Number of Observations 60.449     57.582   
Log-Likelihood 20.878,9640     -13.028,1940   
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Table A.1.a: Unweighted Statistics of Selected Variables of The Whole Sample  
Variable N Mean 
Std 
Dev Minimum Maximum
Child´s Characteristics      
Parent  Receive Transfer 2.387.677 0,0212 0,0144 0,00 1,00
School 2.387.677 0,932 0,253 0,00 1,00
Work 2.387.677 0,100 0,301 0,00 1,00
Age 2.387.677 12,501 1,696 10,00 15,00
Girl Dummy 2.387.677 0,484 0,500 0,00 1,00
Non-White Dummy 2.369.276 0,503 0,500 0,00 1,00
Handcapped Dummy 2.387.677 0,021 0,143 0,00 1,00
Father´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 2.015.720 4,587 4,139 0,00 17,00
Occupied 2.043.370 0,848 0,359 0,00 1,00
Age 2.043.370 43,421 9,056 10,00 127,00
Non-White Dummy 2.032.722 0,522 0,500 0,00 1,00
Transfers 2.043.370 1,802 20,364 0,00 597,00
Handcapped Dummy 2.043.370 0,047 0,211 0,00 1,00
Mother´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 2.310.821 4,916 4,076 0,00 17,00
Occupied 2.339.233 0,464 0,499 0,00 1,00
Age 2.339.233 39,403 7,702 10,00 130,00
Non-White Dummy 2.325.179 0,504 0,500 0,00 1,00
Transfers 2.339.229 1,207 14,185 0,00 595,00
Handcapped Dummy 2.339.233 0,038 0,191 0,00 1,00
Family Characteristics      
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 2.387.677 0,378 0,732 0,00 12,00
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 2.387.677 2,300 1,227 1,00 20,00
Number of Peolpe Aged 16 abd 
Above 2.387.677 0,848 1,147 0,00 24,00
Number of Handiccaped People 2.387.677 0,178 0,481 0,00 10,00
Rural Dummy 2.387.677 0,316 0,465 0,00 1,00
Metropolitan Area Dummy 2.387.677 0,191 0,393 0,00 1,00
Municipality´s Characteristics      
Average Income 2.387.677 238,879 163,637 21,89 2034,51
Average Schooling 2.387.677 4,257 1,450 0,74 7,82
Average Age of Adult People 2.387.677 27,641 2,928 17,40 75,37
Proportion in Rural Area 2.387.677 0,300 0,261 0,00 1,00
Income Standard Deviation 2.387.677 945,297 890,794 72,40 31730,90
Schooling Standard Deviation 2.387.677 3,820 0,674 1,31 5,30
Age Standard Deviation 2.387.677 19,810 2,393 15,12 95,40
 38
 
Table A.1.b: Weighted Basic Statistics - All Sample 
Children Aged 10 to 15 Years Old 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child's Characteristics      
School 428.740 0,945 0,227 0 1
Work 428.740 0,083 0,276 0 1
School Only 428.740 0,876 0,329 0 1
Work Only 428.740 0,014 0,118 0 1
School and Work 428.740 0,069 0,253 0 1
No School/No Work 428.740 0,040 0,197 0 1
Age 428.740 12,487 1,696 10 15
Girl Dummy 428.740 0,491 0,500 0 1
Non-White Dummy 425.513 0,483 0,500 0 1
Father's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 423.917 4,404 4,418 0 17
Unemployment Dummy 428.740 0,051 0,219 0 1
Age 428.740 36,148 17,496 0 120
Transfers 428.740 1,517 19,178 0 590
Mother's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 423.698 5,386 4,248 0 17
Unemployment Dummy 428.740 0,082 0,274 0 1
Age 428.740 38,315 9,128 0 130
Transfers 428.740 0,518 0,500 0 1
Family's Characteristics      
Receive Transfers 428.740 0,018 0,133 0 1
Mother Receive Transfers 428.740 0,009 0,097 0 1
Father Receive Transfers 428.740 0,009 0,095 0 1
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 428.740 0,334 0,674 0 12
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 428.740 2,190 1,149 1 20
Number of People Aged 16 and Above 428.740 0,753 1,053 0 24
Per-Capita Family Income 428.740 219,985 571,040 0 83.333
Rural Dummy 428.740 0,245 0,430 0 1
Metropolitan Area Dummy 428.740 0,240 0,427 0 1
Municipality's Characteristics      
Average Income 428.740 269,494 171,015 28.1 2.035
Average Schooling 428.740 4,543 1,452 1 8
Average Age 428.740 27,782 2,829 17 75
Proportion in Rural Area 428.740 0,244 0,246 0 1
Income Std. Deviation 428.740 1.088,873 946,112 72 31.731
Schooling Std. Dev. 428.740 3,961 0,661 1 5
Age Std. Dev. 428.740 19,697 2,131 15 95
Mayor's Political Party      
pp1 428.740 0,183 0,386 0 1
pp2 428.740 0,045 0,207 0 1
pp3 428.740 0,034 0,180 0 1
pp4 428.740 0,196 0,397 0 1
pp5 428.740 0,037 0,188 0 1
pp6 428.740 0,180 0,384 0 1
pp7 428.740 0,073 0,260 0 1
pp8 428.740 0,066 0,248 0 1
pp9 428.740 0,077 0,267 0 1
pp10 428.740 0,017 0,130 0 1
 39
Additional Controls      
Father Absent 428.740 0,159 0,366 0 1
Mother Absent 428.740 0,021 0,144 0 1
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Table A.2: Logit Model of Receiving Transfers - Children 10 to 15 Years Old 
  All Sample  Poor Children 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error  Coefficients Std. Error 
Child's Characteristics      
Age -0,0209 0,0034  -0,0141 0,0038
Girl Dummy -0,0018 0,0111  0,0053 0,0125
Non-White Dummy 0,1528 0,0123  0,0872 0,0138
Father's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0071 0,0023  0,0072 0,0029
Age -0,0080 0,0009  -0,0075 0,0010
Unemployed Dummy 1,0875 0,0190  0,6085 0,0216
Mother's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0091 0,0021  -0,0024 0,0026
Age -0,0051 0,0010  -0,0050 0,0012
Unemployed Dummy 0,2813 0,0187  0,0692 0,0210
Family's Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers -0,0022 0,0001  -0,0135 0,0003
Rural Dummy 0,0443 0,0146  -0,1027 0,0159
Metropolitan Area Dummy -0,2846 0,0206  -0,4770 0,0264
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 0,0976 0,0069  0,0370 0,0073
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 0,1637 0,0045  0,1137 0,0049
Number of Children Aged above 15 0,0314 0,0055  0,0588 0,0061
Municipality's Characteristics      
Schooling Average -0,1499 0,0212  -0,0923 0,0246
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,0430 0,0351  -0,1542 0,0401
Age Average 0,0138 0,0041  0,0418 0,0049
Age Standard Deviation -0,0153 0,0046  -0,0432 0,0065
Income Minus Transfers Mean 0,0024 0,0001  0,0030 0,0001
Income Minus Transfers Standard 
Deviation -0,0001 0,0000  -0,0001 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,4485 0,0426  0,4792 0,0479
Mayor's Political Party Dummies      
pp1 0,7192 0,0288  0,7811 0,0341
pp2 0,5660 0,0390  0,6311 0,0472
pp3 0,6083 0,0396  0,6626 0,0451
pp4 0,3059 0,0296  0,3514 0,0350
pp5 0,7509 0,0358  0,7960 0,0409
pp6 0,4167 0,0289  0,4061 0,0344
pp7 0,3105 0,0340  0,3240 0,0398
pp8 0,4421 0,0350  0,4484 0,0416
pp9 0,2981 0,0339  0,2425 0,0401
pp10 0,0266 0,0545  -0,0587 0,0618
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,2775 0,0443  -0,3294 0,0490
Mother Absent Dummy -0,5081 0,0626  -0,5116 0,0696
Constant -2,2211 0,1255  -1,6630 0,1457
Number of Observations 416.536   238.621   
Log-Likelihood -117.432,5500    -86.220,9960   
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Table A.3.a: Statistics of The Matched Sample - All Sample 
Boys 10 to 15 Years Old 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 41.044 0,918 0,275 0 1 
Work 41.044 0,144 0,351 0 1 
Only School 41.044 0,801 0,399 0 1 
Only Work 41.044 0,028 0,164 0 1 
School and Work 41.044 0,117 0,321 0 1 
No School and No Work 41.044 0,055 0,228 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 41.044 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 41.044 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 19.405 0,949 0,220 0 1 
Work 19.405 0,141 0,348 0 1 
Only School 19.405 0,827 0,378 0 1 
Only Work 19.405 0,019 0,135 0 1 
School and Work 19.405 0,122 0,327 0 1 
No School and No Work 19.405 0,032 0,176 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 19.405 74,523 109,134 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 19.405 56,186 80,333 0 595 
      
Table A.3.b: Statistics of The Matched Sample - All Sample 
Girls 10 to 15 Years Old 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 39.308 0,932 0,252 0 1 
Work 39.308 0,069 0,254 0 1 
Only School 39.308 0,875 0,331 0 1 
Only Work 39.308 0,012 0,111 0 1 
School and Work 39.308 0,057 0,232 0 1 
No School and No Work 39.308 0,056 0,230 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 39.308 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 39.308 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 18.274 0,961 0,193 0 1 
Work 18.274 0,074 0,261 0 1 
Only School 18.274 0,895 0,307 0 1 
Only Work 18.274 0,008 0,087 0 1 
School and Work 18.274 0,066 0,249 0 1 
No School and No Work 18.274 0,031 0,174 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 18.274 74,550 109,802 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 18.274 57,227 81,176 0 595 
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 Table A.4.a: Statistics of The Matched Sample - Poor Children Sample 
Boys 10 to 15 Years Old 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 31.764 0,904 0,294 0 1 
Work 31.764 0,152 0,359 0 1 
Only School 31.764 0,781 0,414 0 1 
Only Work 31.764 0,029 0,168 0 1 
School and Work 31.764 0,123 0,329 0 1 
No School and No Work 31.764 0,067 0,249 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 31.764 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 31.764 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 15.923 0,946 0,226 0 1 
Work 15.923 0,144 0,351 0 1 
Only School 15.923 0,821 0,384 0 1 
Only Work 15.923 0,019 0,136 0 1 
School and Work 15.923 0,125 0,331 0 1 
No School and No Work 15.923 0,035 0,184 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 15.923 66,415 100,706 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 15.923 49,610 69,056 0 595 
      
Table A.4.b: Statistics of The Matched Sample - Poor Children Sample 
Girls 10 to 15 Years Old 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 29.722 0,921 0,270 0 1 
Work 29.722 0,070 0,256 0 1 
Only School 29.722 0,863 0,343 0 1 
Only Work 29.722 0,013 0,114 0 1 
School and Work 29.722 0,057 0,232 0 1 
No School and No Work 29.722 0,066 0,249 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 29.722 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 29.722 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 15.004 0,958 0,200 0 1 
Work 15.004 0,076 0,266 0 1 
Only School 15.004 0,889 0,314 0 1 
Only Work 15.004 0,007 0,086 0 1 
School and Work 15.004 0,069 0,253 0 1 
No School and No Work 15.004 0,034 0,182 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 15.004 66,496 101,928 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 15.004 50,751 69,773 0 595 
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Table A.5: Logit Model of Receiving Transfers 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
 All Sample  Poor Children 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error  Coefficients Std. Error 
Child's Characteristics      
Age -0,0277 0,0037  -0,0208 0,0042
Girl Dummy -0,0051 0,0123  -0,0028 0,0138
Non-White Dummy 0,1949 0,0137  0,1151 0,0155
Father's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0188 0,0027  -0,0033 0,0035
Age -0,0072 0,0010  -0,0062 0,0011
Mother's Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0202 0,0024  -0,0123 0,0030
Age -0,0054 0,0011  -0,0055 0,0013
Family's Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers -0,0019 0,0001  -0,0141 0,0003
Rural Dummy 0,0137 0,0156  -0,1425 0,0171
Metropolitan Area Dummy -0,3295 0,0254  -0,6401 0,0360
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 0,1089 0,0074  0,0452 0,0078
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 0,1791 0,0049  0,1270 0,0053
Number of Children Aged above 15 0,0269 0,0059  0,0530 0,0065
Municipality's Characteristics      
Schooling Average -0,2048 0,0237  -0,1486 0,0279
Schooling Standard Deviation 0,0807 0,0385  -0,0337 0,0445
Age Average 0,0156 0,0045  0,0439 0,0055
Age Standard Deviation -0,0149 0,0050  -0,0434 0,0074
Income Minus Transfers Mean 0,0026 0,0001  0,0036 0,0002
Income Minus Transfers Standard 
Deviation -0,0001 0,0000  -0,0002 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,5475 0,0464  0,6064 0,0525
Mayor's Political Party Dummies      
pp1 0,6777 0,0333  0,7336 0,0402
pp2 0,5634 0,0451  0,6697 0,0554
pp3 0,6149 0,0447  0,6741 0,0518
pp4 0,2627 0,0343  0,3142 0,0413
pp5 0,7661 0,0402  0,8168 0,0467
pp6 0,4041 0,0336  0,3986 0,0406
pp7 0,2865 0,0389  0,3066 0,0462
pp8 0,4139 0,0405  0,4124 0,0491
pp9 0,2057 0,0390  0,1340 0,0470
pp10 -0,0610 0,0600  -0,1364 0,0683
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,2872 0,0486  -0,2810 0,0538
Mother Absent Dummy -0,5160 0,0689  -0,4778 0,0770
Constant -2,6753 0,1374  -2,1339 0,1615
Number of Observations 452.105   246.536  
Log-Likelihood -102.134,2500    -74.910,3380   
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 Table A.6.a: Statistics of The Matched Sample - All Sample 
Boys 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 34.414 0,912 0,284 0 1 
Work 34.414 0,168 0,374 0 1 
Only School 34.414 0,777 0,417 0 1 
Only Work 34.414 0,033 0,179 0 1 
School and Work 34.414 0,135 0,342 0 1 
No School and No Work 34.414 0,055 0,229 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 34.414 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 34.414 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 15.279 0,946 0,227 0 1 
Work 15.279 0,164 0,370 0 1 
Only School 15.279 0,803 0,397 0 1 
Only Work 15.279 0,021 0,145 0 1 
School and Work 15.279 0,142 0,349 0 1 
No School and No Work 15.279 0,033 0,179 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 15.279 62,098 101,226 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 15.279 55,624 78,078 0 595 
      
Table A.6.b: Statistics of The Matched Sample - All Sample 
Girls 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 32.039 0,929 0,256 0 1 
Work 32.039 0,076 0,265 0 1 
Only School 32.039 0,867 0,340 0 1 
Only Work 32.039 0,013 0,114 0 1 
School and Work 32.039 0,063 0,242 0 1 
No School and No Work 32.039 0,057 0,233 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 32.039 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 32.039 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 14.273 0,959 0,197 0 1 
Work 14.273 0,085 0,279 0 1 
Only School 14.273 0,883 0,321 0 1 
Only Work 14.273 0,009 0,094 0 1 
School and Work 14.273 0,076 0,265 0 1 
No School and No Work 14.273 0,032 0,175 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 14.273 60,971 100,823 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 14.273 57,647 80,003 0 595 
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 Table A.7.a: Statistics of The Matched Sample - Poor Children Sample 
Boys 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 26.065 0,897 0,304 0 1 
Work 26.065 0,175 0,380 0 1 
Only School 26.065 0,755 0,430 0 1 
Only Work 26.065 0,034 0,181 0 1 
School and Work 26.065 0,141 0,348 0 1 
No School and No Work 26.065 0,069 0,254 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 26.065 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 26.065 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 12.416 0,942 0,234 0 1 
Work 12.416 0,171 0,377 0 1 
Only School 12.416 0,793 0,405 0 1 
Only Work 12.416 0,022 0,147 0 1 
School and Work 12.416 0,149 0,356 0 1 
No School and No Work 12.416 0,036 0,187 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 12.416 51,805 88,501 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 12.416 48,916 65,666 0 595 
      
Table A.7.b: Statistics of The Matched Sample - Poor Children Sample 
Girls 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 Without Transfers 
School 24.412 0,920 0,272 0 1 
Work 24.412 0,078 0,269 0 1 
Only School 24.412 0,855 0,352 0 1 
Only Work 24.412 0,014 0,116 0 1 
School and Work 24.412 0,065 0,246 0 1 
No School and No Work 24.412 0,067 0,250 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 24.412 0,000 0,000 0 0 
Transfers to Mothers 24.412 0,000 0,000 0 0 
 With Transfers 
School 11.586 0,956 0,205 0 1 
Work 11.586 0,090 0,286 0 1 
Only School 11.586 0,875 0,331 0 1 
Only Work 11.586 0,009 0,094 0 1 
School and Work 11.586 0,081 0,273 0 1 
No School and No Work 11.586 0,035 0,184 0 1 
Transfers to Fathers 11.586 51,070 89,117 0 590 
Transfers to Mothers 11.586 50,614 67,128 0 595 
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Table A8 
 
Logit Model on School Attendance - Poor Children Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father 0,0023 0,0004  0,0020 0,0004
Transfers to Mother 0,0055 0,0005  0,0060 0,0006
Child´s Characteristics      
Age -0,3645 0,0111  -0,3763 0,0126
Non-White Dummy -0,0154 0,0394  0,0676 0,0428
Father´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,0875 0,0100  0,0564 0,0109
Age -0,0088 0,0026  -0,0021 0,0030
Unemployed Dummy -0,0896 0,0660  0,0935 0,0768
Mother´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,1275 0,0089  0,1528 0,0102
Age -0,0105 0,0031  -0,0049 0,0035
Unemployed Dummy -0,1153 0,0631  0,0910 0,0733
Family´s Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0012 0,0008  0,0026 0,0008
Rural Dummy -0,2314 0,0442  -0,4551 0,0508
Metropolitan Area Dummy 0,1327 0,0841  0,0119 0,0894
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 -0,2398 0,0183  -0,2009 0,0205
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 -0,0428 0,0130  0,0124 0,0147
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0141 0,0153  -0,0135 0,0174
Minicipality´s Characteristics      
Schooling Average 0,3478 0,0765  0,1901 0,0849
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,1259 0,1153  0,0477 0,1298
Age Average -0,0855 0,0193  -0,1144 0,0218
Age Standard Deviation 0,2242 0,0340  0,3113 0,0388
Income Minus Transfers Mean -0,0016 0,0004  -0,0015 0,0004
Income Minus Transfers Standard 
Deviation 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,4383 0,1306  -0,0258 0,1480
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,5772 0,1315  -0,2007 0,1524
Mother Absent Dummy -0,7386 0,1737  -0,2491 0,2047
Constant 4,8805 0,4426  3,7019 0,5073
Number of Observations 47.687     44.726   
Log-Likelihood 
-
12.115,3120     -9.884,9754   
 
 47
 
 
Table A9 
 
Logit Model on Child Labor - Poor Children Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father -0,0005 0,0003  0,0002 0,0004
Transfers to Mother -0,0003 0,0003  0,0008 0,0004
Child´s Characteristics      
Age 0,4071 0,0089  0,3853 0,0123
Non-White Dummy 0,0084 0,0312  -0,0780 0,0413
Father´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0357 0,0076  -0,0447 0,0105
Age -0,0011 0,0022  -0,0015 0,0030
Unemployed Dummy -0,7480 0,0735  -0,3900 0,0921
Mother´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0290 0,0065  -0,0680 0,0092
Age 0,0073 0,0026  0,0054 0,0035
Unemployed Dummy -0,2972 0,0639  -0,3376 0,0837
Family´s Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0064 0,0006  0,0069 0,0008
Rural Dummy 0,8121 0,0358  0,2371 0,0481
Metropolitan Area Dummy -0,6804 0,0976  -0,5460 0,1216
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 0,0981 0,0152  0,1457 0,0200
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 0,1079 0,0103  0,1103 0,0138
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0686 0,0128  -0,0453 0,0173
Minicipality´s Characteristics      
Schooling Average 0,0436 0,0574  0,2407 0,0764
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,4383 0,0902  -0,3536 0,1230
Age Average 0,0676 0,0111  0,0819 0,0149
Age Standard Deviation -0,0106 0,0143  -0,0422 0,0185
Income Minus Transfers Mean -0,0003 0,0003  -0,0013 0,0004
Income Minus Transfers Standard Deviation 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,6054 0,1033  1,5034 0,1423
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,2154 0,1111  -0,0205 0,1507
Mother Absent Dummy 0,1233 0,1611  -0,0457 0,2291
Constant -8,3540 0,3177  -9,4440 0,4351
Number of Observations 47.687     44.726   
Log-Likelihood -16.988,0460     -10.323,1800   
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Table A10 
 
Logit Model on School Attendance - All Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father 0,0013 0,0004  0,0017 0,0005
Transfers to Mother 0,0049 0,0005  0,0049 0,0006
Child´s Characteristics      
Age -0,3665 0,0112  -0,3871 0,0130
Non-White Dummy -0,0748 0,0405  0,0518 0,0447
Father´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,0936 0,0099  0,0811 0,0113
Age -0,0076 0,0026  0,0009 0,0031
Mother´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,1296 0,0088  0,1411 0,0102
Age -0,0088 0,0030  -0,0009 0,0038
Family´s Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0003 0,0002  0,0013 0,0003
Rural Dummy -0,4142 0,0448  -0,5098 0,0521
Metropolitan Area Dummy 0,0316 0,0853  0,0435 0,0965
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 -0,2053 0,0186  -0,2053 0,0214
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 -0,0301 0,0134  -0,0132 0,0153
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0018 0,0148  -0,0518 0,0169
Minicipality´s Characteristics      
Schooling Average 0,4719 0,0782  0,1875 0,0900
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,3354 0,1170  0,0667 0,1347
Age Average -0,0942 0,0195  -0,1133 0,0219
Age Standard Deviation 0,2859 0,0342  0,2655 0,0387
Income Minus Transfers Mean -0,0021 0,0004  -0,0013 0,0005
Income Minus Transfers Standard Deviation 0,0001 0,0000  -0,0001 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,3551 0,1313  0,1559 0,1508
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,5357 0,1327  -0,0593 0,1563
Mother Absent Dummy -0,5844 0,1687  -0,2505 0,2114
Constant 4,2884 0,4354  4,5182 0,5083
Number of Observations 49.693     46.312   
Log-Likelihood -12.000,1560     -9.481,8464   
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Table A11 
 
Logit Model on Child Labor - All Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father -0,0005 0,0003  0,0002 0,0003
Transfers to Mother -0,0002 0,0003  0,0011 0,0004
Child´s Characteristics      
Age 0,4267 0,0084  0,3949 0,0116
Non-White Dummy 0,0204 0,0296  -0,0334 0,0398
Father´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0474 0,0064  -0,0365 0,0090
Age 0,0003 0,0020  -0,0061 0,0029
Mother´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0282 0,0057  -0,0685 0,0080
Age 0,0043 0,0024  0,0102 0,0033
Family´s Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0005 0,0001  0,0003 0,0001
Rural Dummy 0,8025 0,0335  0,2088 0,0455
Metropolitan Area Dummy -0,6286 0,0757  -0,6124 0,1041
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 0,0934 0,0146  0,0941 0,0200
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 0,0778 0,0100  0,1003 0,0134
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0522 0,0118  -0,0010 0,0157
Minicipality´s Characteristics      
Schooling Average 0,1938 0,0523  0,2641 0,0735
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,5480 0,0834  -0,5665 0,1160
Age Average 0,0620 0,0095  0,0978 0,0142
Age Standard Deviation -0,0186 0,0099  -0,0595 0,0183
Income Minus Transfers Mean -0,0008 0,0003  -0,0009 0,0004
Income Minus Transfers Standard Deviation 0,0000 0,0000  0,0001 0,0000
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,6285 0,0964  1,1445 0,1339
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,1905 0,1041  -0,1804 0,1441
Mother Absent Dummy 0,0934 0,1432  0,1833 0,2119
Constant -7,9636 0,2843  -8,6602 0,4066
Number of Observations 49.693     46.312   
Log-Likelihood -19.175,8500     -11.457,3950   
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Table A12 
Logit Model on School Attendance - Poor Children Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father 0,0019 0,0004  0,0019 0,0005
Transfers to Mother 0,0063 0,0006  0,0058 0,0007
Child´s Characteristics      
Age -0,3631 0,0119  -0,3762 0,0140
Non-White Dummy 0,0310 0,0423  0,0362 0,0474
Father´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,0785 0,0114  0,0634 0,0129
Age -0,0069 0,0028  0,0004 0,0033
Mother´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling 0,1280 0,0100  0,1183 0,0114
Age -0,0070 0,0034  -0,0136 0,0039
Family´s Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0009 0,0008  0,0024 0,0009
Rural Dummy -0,3697 0,0475  -0,4607 0,0550
Metropolitan Area Dummy -0,0409 0,1011  0,0938 0,1188
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 -0,2150 0,0193  -0,2219 0,0218
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 -0,0306 0,0139  -0,0083 0,0161
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0302 0,0158  -0,0206 0,0185
Minicipality´s Characteristics      
Schooling Average 0,4239 0,0844  0,2513 0,0966
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,2426 0,1258  -0,0579 0,1443
Age Average -0,0536 0,0207  -0,0972 0,0238
Age Standard Deviation 0,1829 0,0361  0,2847 0,0421
Income Minus Transfers Mean -0,0027 0,0005  -0,0017 0,0005
Income Minus Transfers Standard Deviation 0,0000 0,0000  0,0000 0,0001
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,4480 0,1410  0,3398 0,1614
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,5770 0,1434  -0,0982 0,1679
Mother Absent Dummy -0,6222 0,1843  -0,6643 0,2352
Constant 4,9412 0,4746  4,2400 0,5554
Number of Observations 38.481     35.998   
Log-Likelihood -10.404,7870     -8.206,3336   
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Table A13 
 
Logit Model on Child Labor - Poor Children Sample 
Children 10 to 15 Years Old with Employed Parents Only 
  Boys   Girls 
Variables Coefficients Std. Error   Coefficients Std. Error 
Transfers to Father -0,0005 0,0003  0,0003 0,0004
Transfers to Mother -0,0002 0,0004  0,0013 0,0004
Child´s Characteristics      
Age 0,4028 0,0093  0,3676 0,0129
Non-White Dummy 0,0427 0,0328  -0,0599 0,0437
Father´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0354 0,0082  -0,0231 0,0115
Age -0,0014 0,0023  -0,0064 0,0032
Mother´s Characteristics      
Years of Schooling -0,0186 0,0070  -0,0697 0,0101
Age 0,0132 0,0027  0,0079 0,0038
Family´s Characteristics      
Per-Capita Income Minus Transfers 0,0044 0,0006  0,0061 0,0009
Rural Dummy 0,9113 0,0380  0,3472 0,0508
Metropolitan Area Dummy -0,6300 0,1180  -0,6655 0,1599
Number of Children Aged 0 to 5 0,1016 0,0156  0,1509 0,0205
Number of Children Aged 6 to 15 0,0975 0,0108  0,1037 0,0146
Number of Children Aged above 15 -0,0965 0,0132  -0,0011 0,0176
Minicipality´s Characteristics      
Schooling Average -0,0034 0,0612  0,3248 0,0831
Schooling Standard Deviation -0,2715 0,0950  -0,4763 0,1309
Age Average 0,0781 0,0113  0,0664 0,0147
Age Standard Deviation -0,0276 0,0130  -0,0218 0,0158
Income Minus Transfers Mean -0,0010 0,0004  -0,0019 0,0006
Income Minus Transfers Standard Deviation 0,0000 0,0000  0,0001 0,0001
Proportion Living in Rural Area 0,8066 0,1087  1,3552 0,1494
Additional Controls      
Father Absent Dummy -0,2016 0,1160  -0,2551 0,1607
Mother Absent Dummy 0,5342 0,1599  0,2161 0,2427
Constant -8,9262 0,3272  -8,9861 0,4518
Number of Observations 38.481     35.998   
Log-Likelihood -15.343,1500     -9.251,0568   
 
